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3.20 세계 곳곳의 반전행동 사진들 모음(2)

3.20 세계 곳곳의 반전행동 사진모음

지난 2월 27일 오후 3시 민주노동당 회의실에서 열린 자유무역협정 WTO 반 대 국민행동 토론회 '운동으로서의 세계사회포럼, 우리의 과제는 무엇인가?' 자료집입니다. 목차는 다음과 같습니다. - 자유무역협정․WTO반대 국민행동 4차 세계사회포럼 활동 보고 및 평가 토론회 1부 발제문: 4차 세계사회포럼에 대한 평가 - 다른 세계는 어떻게 가능한가 - 제4차 세계사회포럼을 다녀와서 (유영 주, 노동자의힘) - 제4차 뭄바이 세계사회포럼이 남기고 간 반(反)신자유주의 운동의 '쟁점 과 전망' (박준규, 아래로부터세계화) - 제4회 세계사회포럼과 인권운동 (박래군, 인권운동사랑방) - 제4회 세계사회포럼 평가 ( 정지영, 사회진보연대) 토론회 2부 발제문: 운동으로서 세계사회포럼, 우리의 과제는 무엇인가? - 운동으로서 세계사회포럼, 우리 운동의 과제는 무엇인가? (이종회, 자유 무역협정․WTO반대 국민행동) - 대안세계화운동의 현황과 과제에 대한 메모(이창근, 민주노총) ➡ 참고자료 - 사회운동 및 대중조직의 투쟁호소문 - 뭄바이 제4차 세계 사회 포럼(WSF Mumbai): 다른 (미디어) 세상을 향한 국제주의 (김명준, 미디액트 소장) - 세계사회포럼 영화제 참관기 (이진영, 인권운동사랑방) - 세계사회포럼 민주노총 참가단 활동 보고 - 세계사회포럼 공무원 노조 참가단 총평

사회진보연대 3월호에 실린 '이라크는 지금'이라는 제목의 이라크 현지상황 정리 글입니다.

임마뉴엘 월러스틴 "칸쿤: 신자유주의 공세의 붕괴" 2003년 10월 1일 "자유무역의 모호성", 2003년 12월 15일 페르낭 브로델 센터 홈페이지에서 퍼온 짧은 논평입니다. * 홈페이지 http://fbc.binghamton.edu/ 앞의 글은 북반구 국가들이 실제로 자유무역의 철칙을 준수하지 않았고, 특히 지적 재산권 문제에 관한 북반구의 태도는 대표적인 "보호주의적" 경 향이다, 하지만 북반구 국가들도 농업과 제조업 시장을 개방하라는 G-21 (브라질, 인도, 중국, 남아공 등)로 조직된 미들파워 국가들의 요구로 칸 쿤 회의가 타결되지 않은 것은 남반구 국가들의 정치적 승리이자 포르투 알레그레로 모인 사회운동의 성과이다, 그러므로 이제 WTO는 실제로 붕괴 하고 있다는 "낙관적인" 주장을 펼치었더군요. 뒤의 글은 자유무역과 보호무역에 관한 논쟁은 500년의 역사를 갖고 있으 나, 역사적으로 볼 때 자유무역의 미덕을 강조하는 국가들도 실상 그것을 완전히 실현하는 것은 아니고, 특히 최근 미국과 유럽연합의 철강 관세에 관한 분쟁은 그 사실을 확인시켜준다는 내용이네요. * * * Commentary No. 122, Oct. 1, 2003 "Cancun: The Collapse of the Neo-Liberal Offensive" Cancun is more than just a passing geopolitical battle. It represents the interment of a neo-liberal offensive that started in the 1970s. To understand the importance of the event, we have to go back to the beginning. The 1970s marks a turning-point in two cyclical rhythms of the capitalist world-economy. It was the beginning of a long stagnation of the world-economy, a Kondratieff-B phase, out of which we have not yet come. And it marks the moment when the hegemony of the United States in the world-system began to decline. Stagnations in the world-economy mean that the rate of profit has gone down to an important degree, as a result of increased competition in the leading industries and a consequent overproduction. This leads to two kinds of geoeconomic battles: a struggle among the centers of capital accumulation (the United States, western Europe, and Japan/East Asia) to shift the burden of lowered rates of profit to each other. I call this "exporting unemployment," and it has been going on for thirty years, with each of the three centers doing better at different times (Europe in the 1970s, Japan in the 1980s, and the U.S. in the late 1990s). The second geoeconomic battle however is that between the center and the periphery, the North and the South, in which the North seeks to take back from the South whatever small gains they made during the preceding Kondratieff A-period of expansion (ca. 1945-1970). As everyone knows, Latin America, Africa, eastern Europe, and South Asia all for the most part did poorly after 1970. The only area in the South that did relatively well was eastern and southeast Asia, at least until the financial crisis of the late 1990s. But one area of the periphery always does well in a downturn, since there has to be some region into which declining industries move. In this difficult period when capitalists were scrambling to maintain their income, partially through relocation of production but more often through financial speculation, they started what can only be called a counteroffensive against the gains of the South and of the working classes in the North in the previous A-period. This came to be called "neo-liberalism." The political face of this counteroffensive was to be found first of all in the transformation of the British Conservative Party and the U.S. Republican Party from a party of moderate Keynesians to a party of ferocious believers in the nostrums of Milton Friedman. Mrs. Thatcher's years as Prime Minister and Ronald Reagan's term as President of the United States represented a distinct turn to the right in both national and world policy, but even more importantly a transformation of their own party structures, as the basis of pushing the balance-point of internal politics from the center to considerably right of center. The new conservative policy constituted a pushback on all three sources of rising cost for producers: wages, the internalization of costs to reduce ecological damage, and state taxation to finance the welfare state. There was an attempt to coordinate this policy throughout the countries of the North by creating a series of new institutions, notably the Trilateral Commission, the G-7, and the World Economic Forum of Davos. The economic policy that was proposed came to called the Washington Consensus. First of all, we should note the Washington Consensus replaced something called developmentalism. Developmentalism had been the reigning world economic policy in the previous period (in the late 1960s the United Nations had even proclaimed that the 1970s would be the "Decade of Development"). The basic premise of developmentalism had been that every country could "develop," if only its state would implement appropriate policies, and the end point would be a world of states all looking more or less the same and all more or less equally wealthy. Of course, developmentalism did not work, could not work, which sad reality became clear to everyone in the 1970s. In its place, the Washington Consensus proclaimed that the world was in the era of "globalization." Globalization was said to be the triumph of the free market, the radical reduction of the economic role of the state, and above all, the elimination of all state- created barriers to trans-border movements of goods and capital. The Washington Consensus ordained that the prime role of governments, especially those in the South, was to end the illusions of developmentalism, and accept the unrestricted opening of their frontiers. Mrs. Thatcher trumpeted that they had no choice. She said: TINA, there is no alternative. TINA meant that any government that did not conform would be punished, first of all by the world market and second of all by interstate institutions. There has been insufficient attention to the fact that it was only beginning in the 1970s that interstate institutions began to play a significant role in these geoeconomic struggles. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were turned into very active enforcers of the Washington Consensus. They could play this role because the states of the South, grievously hurt by the stagnation of the world-economy, were short on funds and had to turn constantly to outside lenders to compensate for a negative balance of payments. The IMF in particular imposed drastic conditions on such loans, conditions which generally required considerably reduced social services within the country and gave priority to the repayment of external debt over anything else. In the 1980s, it was decided to go further. The World Trade Organization (WTO) had been an idea first discussed in the 1940s. But it had foundered on considerable differences among the centers of capital accumulation. What enabled it to proceed in the 1980s was the common agreement of the countries of the North that it could be a very useful tool in furthering the Washington Consensus. In theory, the WTO stands for the opening of frontiers, the maximization of a free world market. The major problem is that the North has never quite meant this. They wanted the countries of the South to open their frontiers, but they didn't really want to reciprocate. After the United States succeeded in creating the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and Europe had proceeded further in its economic union, the countries of the North decided it was time to implement their program in the WTO. The moment chosen was the Seattle meeting of 1999. The North had however waited too long. The ravages of the Washington Consensus - increasing unemployment, ecological degradation, destruction of food autonomy - led to an unexpectedly strong protest movement which managed to bring together many different kinds of groups from anarchists to environmentalists to trade-unionists. And their combined protests managed to render impotent the meeting. In addition to this, at Seattle, the U.S. and western Europe were at odds with each other because of their respective protectionist policies against each other. So Seattle closed without accomplishing anything. At this point, two major events occurred. The first was the founding of the World Social Forum (WSF), which held its first three meetings at Porto Alegre, and which constituted a "movement of movements" against neo-liberalism, the Washington Consensus, and the forum of Davos. It has been remarkably successful thus far. The second event was 9/11, which led to the proclamation of the Bush doctrine of unilateral preemptive action against anyone the U.S. government designated as "terrorists." Initially the effect of 9/11 was that of much worldwide support for the fight against "terrorism." And it was soon after this that the next WTO meeting was held in Doha. At that meeting, the North was able to impose on a momentarily intimidated South the acceptance of an agreement to discuss new treaties that would open world economic frontiers considerably further. These treaties were to be consecrated in 2003 at Cancun. Once again, Cancun came too late. Between Doha and Cancun came the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, which turned world sentiment strongly against the U.S. and exposed the serious limitations of U.S. military power. And in the meantime the world peace movement had considerably strengthened the forces of Porto Alegre, which in turn were able to place considerable pressure on the countries of the South to strengthen their backbone. At Cancun, the more or less united forces of the North pushed their program of opening the frontiers of the South to their goods and capital, while protecting the intellectual property of the North (patents) against dilution or non-respect. The South counterorganized. Brazil took the lead in creating a Group of 21 (including India, China, and South Africa) who said in essence that in return the South insisted on an opening of the frontiers of the North to the South's agriculture and manufactures. In this battle, the Group of 21, who were "middle powers," obtained the support of the poorer countries, notably in Africa. Since the North was not willing, for its internal political reasons, to make any serious concessions to the South, the South did not budge. The result was deadlock. This is seen by everyone as a political victory for the states of the South. It should be clear that this victory was made possible by the conjuncture of U.S. geopolitical weakness and the strength of the forces of Porto Alegre. The WTO is now effectively dead. It will survive on paper, as do many other interstate institutions, but it will no longer matter. The U.S. hopes to recoup the situation by going unilateral. It will find that it will not be easy to get significant countries in the South to sign one-sided free trade treaties. The South will now move on to challenge the IMF and the World Bank. Indeed, this offensive has already begun, and the strong defiance of Argentina's President Kirchner has shown that such defiance can work. It will not be long before the term "neo-liberalism" will represent the almost forgotten follies of yesteryear. Immanuel Wallerstein * * * Commentary No. 127, Dec. 15, 2003 "The Ambiguities of Free Trade" The debate about free trade versus protectionism has been going on for 500 years, all through the history of our modern world-system. The argument is favor of free trade has always been that it results in maximum competition, therefore maximum efficiency of production, therefore reduction of prices, and ultimately benefits to the consumer. The argument in favor of protectionism has always been that free trade has very negative consequences for various national economic situations, both in the short run and the long run. In the short run, it increases unemployment and causes the failures of local enterprises. And in the long run, it locks weaker countries into lower-profit types of economic activities. Of course, both sides are right up to a point. But the abstract virtues of free trade versus protectionism never determine what actually happens. Ultimately, the question is as much political as it is economic. Those countries who are at a given moment particularly efficient at productive activities are normally the ones who proclaim the virtues of free trade. Free trade obviously serves their national interests. It means they can sell their products in foreign markets without the penalty of tariffs or other barriers. It means they can invest surplus capital in other countries. Those countries who are moderately strong but still weaker than the strongest are normally the ones who try to be protectionist. They feel that, if they can protect their internal markets for a while from the competition of producers in the strongest countries, they can improve their own efficiencies and develop a sufficient internal market to withstand open competition. For them, it is a matter of time. The protection is temporary. Truly economically weak countries are usually too weak politically to get away with protectionism. The ambiguities arise when we look at the strong countries who proclaim the virtues of free trade. The strong countries are in favor of free trade only up to a point. For example, in the seventeenth century, the Dutch (then called the United Provinces), who were then the most efficient producers (and traders) in Europe, preached the virtues of free trade to a weaker England and France. But that didn't mean that the Dutch didn't protect certain markets. In 1663, Sir George Downing, a British statesman, bitterly noted about Dutch policy: "It is mare liberum [open seas] in the British seas but mare clausum [closed seas] on the coast of Africa and the East Indies." The British had to fight three maritime wars with the Dutch to even the playing field in world trade for them. This story is being repeated today. The United States after 1945 was the most efficient producer, and of course favored free trade. Still, in order to strengthen politically their alliances against the Soviet Union, the U.S. allowed western Europe, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to engage in certain protectionist processes. This strengthened these countries economically up to a point. When, as of the 1970s they became highly competitive with the United States, the U.S. began to complain about their protectionist policies. But precisely because the U.S. had become relatively weaker economically, it also strengthened its own protectionist policies amidst a declining manufacturing sector. The U.S. government, like other governments, was faced with internal political pressure to preserve jobs and profits for local entrepreneurs. The United States turned its eyes towards what it called "emerging markets," which meant some of the larger countries in the world's South - countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, India and Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey, South Africa and Nigeria, Brazil and Argentina. It saw these countries as outlets for U.S. products - manufactures, information services and biotechnology - as well as for financial transactions. But these countries had all been devoted to a developmentalist ideology which led them to engage in certain protectionist policies. So the U.S. explained to them that in an age of "globalization" such practices were evil and counterproductive, The emerging markets had to open themselves to the free market, meaning to U.S. (and other) investments and activities. The major tools to obtain compliance with this new regime were the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. Treasury, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which would lay down enforceable rules of free trade. These rules of course were meant to apply to others, not really to the United States. The problem with rules, however, is that others can also use them. When the U.S. (and western Europe) tried to extend these rules further to the so-called emerging markets, they found resistance at Cancun, where Brazil led a coalition of the middle powers insisting that rules worked both ways - that if the South were to lower barriers to free trade, the U.S. and the rest of the North must do so as well (see Commentary 122, Oct. 1, 2003). The U.S. refused to go along and hence Cancun was a failure. But an even greater problem was lurking for the U.S. Europe (and others in the North) were very unhappy about U.S. protectionism, which hurt their own interests directly. When George W. Bush placed tariffs on steel, to protect U.S. manufactures in states that were electorally crucial to him (such as West Virginia and Ohio), the Europeans brought a case in the WTO Tribunal, charging the U.S. with violating the treaty. They won the case, and obtained the right to pose countertariffs, which they threatened to do against U.S. products important in other states electorally important to George Bush (like Florida and Michigan). As a result, George Bush swallowed hard, and revoked the steel tariffs. But the Europeans weren't through. They plan to use the same countertariffs if the U.S. does not end the tax breaks it gives U.S. corporations for their offshore operations. It seems these too violate the WTO treaty. And, if this wasn't enough, when George Bush announced that he wasn't going to let the French, Germans, Russians, and Canadians bid on contracts to rebuild Iraq, it was immediately suggested that this violated the same WTO treaty. All of a sudden, the WTO - virtually a U.S. invention and cherished achievement - began to seem like an albatross around the neck of the United States. Free trade is marvelous of course, at least if one doesn't have to bear its negative costs oneself. Immanuel Wallerstein